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I. Introduction
Under the upcoming President Trump Administration, many of the immigration enforcement initiatives that states have adopted during the past two decades might be extended
nationwide. Yet, we still lack a good understanding of many of the consequences that such measures are having on the population they are intended to target. In particular, while the literature has noted a flight of likely unauthorized immigrants away from states enacting employment verification (E-Verify) mandates or omnibus immigration laws (e.g. AmuedoDorantes and Bansak 2012, 2014; : Amuedo-Dorantes and Lozano 2015; Bohn et al. 2014 Bohn et al. , 2015 Good 2013; Orrenius and Zavodny 2015) , very little attention has been paid to where that population is relocating to. Have unauthorized migrants leaving states that have enacted harsher immigration enforcement measures -as exemplified by a combination of E-Verify mandates and police-based measures responsible for higher deportation rates, such as omnibus immigration laws-gone back to Mexico? Or, rather, have they moved to less punitive U.S. states? And, in the latter case, which states are receiving these migrant outflows?
Learning about the migration trajectories of unauthorized immigrants leaving states that intensify immigration enforcement is crucial, especially from a policy perspective. After all, knowledge of such mobility patterns is essential in assessing the effectiveness of tougher interior immigration enforcement, in deciding how much enforcement is needed and where, as well as in assessing the hidden costs or benefits to other states of a piecemeal approach to immigration enforcement.
In this study, we address the questions formulated above using Arizona as a case study.
During the past decade, Arizona heightened its immigration enforcement with two widely publicized measures: a) The 2007 Legalized Arizona Workers Act (LAWA hereafter), which instituted a universal E-verify mandate that applies to employers in both the public and private sectors; and b) the State Bill 1070 (SB1070 hereafter), which allowed law enforcement agents to stop individuals on presumption of unlawful presence in the United States to check their immigration status. Previous studies have found that LAWA altered the internal demographic composition of the resident population of the state by reducing the shares of likely unauthorized immigrants residing in Arizona (e.g. Bohn et al. 2014 Bohn et al. , 2015 We answer those questions using data from the 2001-2012 American Community Surveys, along with data on removals from Customs Border Patrol (CBP) over that time period of intensified immigration enforcement. After assessing the reliability of our measurement of the likely unauthorized population, we identify the states to which likely unauthorized migrants leaving Arizona following the enactment of LAWA and SB1070 have relocated to.
Subsequently, using two different control groups: (1) one constituted by U.S. states that did not adopt similar immigration enforcement measures to the ones adopted in Arizona, and (2) a second one derived using the synthetic control method, we examine the degree to which the trajectories of likely unauthorized immigrants leaving Arizona differed from those of their counterparts departing from other U.S. states using a quasi-experimental approach. We arrive to two main findings. First, the choice of control group matters. While, regardless of control group, Mexican non-citizens leaving Arizona for another U.S. state appear more likely to have moved to New Mexico or California than their counterparts leaving other states, other destination states differ depending on the control group being used. Thus, the results underscore the potential sensitivity of analyses exploring the response of migratory flows to tougher state level immigration enforcement policies to the choice of control group.
Second, it is unclear the extent to which tougher immigration enforcement in Arizona might have been responsible for the observed migration trajectories given that: (a) in some instances, states that had also adopted a universal E-Verify mandate and an omnibus immigration law, as was the case with Utah, proved likely destinations of Mexican non-citizens leaving Arizona, and (b) regardless of the methodology being used, some of the destinations of Mexican non-citizens were also popular among non-Hispanic natives. Given their U.S. citizenship, this group is not likely to have been the primary target of intensified enforcement. In fact, because of their distinct ethnicity, they are also not likely to be members of the same households as
Mexicans non-citizens. Therefore, any immigration enforcement impacts should be of second order. In conclusion, we are unable to rule out the importance of other macroeconomic or political factors in the mobility exhibited by Mexican non-citizens or, alternatively, the possibility of complementarities between immigrants and natives.
II. Background of Interior Immigration Enforcement and Mobility Patterns
Naturally, one of the most examined consequences of immigration enforcement in the literature has been its impact on the mobility decisions and migratory patterns of the population for whom it is intended -namely, unauthorized immigrants. 
III. Data and Population Movement Statistics
To address the aforementioned questions, we use a pooled sample of the [2001] [2002] [2003] [2004] [2005] [2006] [2007] [2008] [2009] [2010] [2011] [2012] American Community Survey (ACS) -a time span encompassing the period of tougher interior immigration enforcement. We take advantage of the battery of migration questions asking whether the reference person moved in the last year, whether this move was across states, and which state s/he moved to, allowing us to track individuals across interstate migrations. 
IV. Empirical Methodology
The descriptive statistics in Figures 1 and 2 To double check whether the broader control group and Arizona's synthetic control appear to be suitable controls, Table 1 shows the average share of Mexican non-citizen interstate movers before the enactment of LAWA and SB1070, along with its predictors, for Arizona, the donor pool (our broader control group) and Arizona's synthetic control group. The average values of the series of Mexican non-citizens interstate movers in Arizona hovers around 4 percent, whereas the share in the donor pool (our broader control group) and Arizona's synthetic control group prior to the passage of both immigration measures is approximately half (2 percent). In other words, there are unavoidable pre-intervention differences between Arizona and the two control groups. Nonetheless, Arizona and the two control groups being used are rather similar when it comes to the relevance of the construction sector -an industry that experienced a significant boom in Arizona prior to 2007. Indeed, the shares of the labor force employed in the construction sector in Arizona, the broader control group and Arizona's synthetic control group fluctuated between 4 and 5 percent. Yet, the average values for the share of foreign-born and the share of high school dropouts in the broader control group prior to 2007 resemble those of Arizona more than the average values of Arizona's synthetic control during that same time period. Altogether, the broader control group appears to be a more reasonable approximation of Arizona prior to 2007.
Next, we use information on respondents' current and last year's states of residence to assess the degree to which the destinations of Mexican non-citizens leaving Arizona following the intensification of immigration enforcement significantly differed from those of Mexican noncitizens leaving other U.S. states in our two distinct control groups. To that tend, we estimate equation (1) as a multinomial logit:
, for: j = 0, 1, … 7.
where j takes the values from 0 to 7 to represent the main destinations of Mexican non-citizens moving across states: CA, TX, NM, UT, NV and CO, followed by 'all other U.S. states', 7 and where 0 represents Mexican non-citizens who do not move. In other words, the model in equation (1) provides a set of probabilities for the 8 mobility choices of Mexican non-citizens with traits specified in . Because the probabilities sum to one, only 7 parameter vectors are needed to determine the 8 probabilities. Therefore, we can rewrite equation (1) as follows:
, for: j = 1, 2, … 7 and compute the following 7 log-odds ratios: � , , ⁄ �. The multinomial logit assumes that adding another destination (e.g. Mexico) does not affect the relative odds of choosing any of the U.S. destinations (i.e. the independence of irrelevant alternatives or IIA). Note, however, that the IIA refers to choices that might be considered close substitutes -an unlikely assumption in the case of Mexico as opposed to other U.S. states. 9 Individual level characteristics (such as age, gender, and dummies for whether the respondent is married, has less than a high school education, employed and, in the latter case, for whether s/he is a wage and salaried worker) and characteristics of the state s the ith respondent is leaving at time t, such as the shares of the state's total population in industries with the highest concentration of immigrant labor (i.e. agriculture, construction, retail, food services and administrative support) are included as controls. In that manner, we address uneven impacts of the past recession on Arizona's labor market given the boom of the construction sector prior to the downturn in Arizona and the large share of Mexican non-citizens employed in that industry. 10 At this point, it is worth pointing out that this coefficient could be potentially capturing the effect of increased border enforcement or local immigration enforcement initiatives adopted in the state after 2007, as was the case with some 287(g) agreements and, more importantly, Secure Communities. Note, however, that border enforcement and local initiatives were not unique to Arizona. Border enforcement should have impacted other states in the synthetic control group, such as California or Texas. Similarly, 287(g) agreements and, especially, Secure Communities were adopted by many counties and states in our control groups. Therefore, their role in the interaction coefficient Table 2 displays the odds ratios from the multinomial logit regression. Panel A displays the results from estimating the multinomial model using Arizona's synthetic control group, whereas Panel B shows the results from estimating the same model using the broader control group. In all cases, the omitted category is Mexican non-citizens who do not engage in interstate migration. The first row in each panel presents the odds of moving from Arizona into another U.S. state before 2007, whereas the second row in Table 2 further reveals which states became popular destination for all Mexican non-citizen interstate movers, not just those leaving Arizona, after 2007. Of greater interest to us is the odd ratio in the third rows of Table 2 states. The next most common destinations were Texas, Nevada and California.
V. Main Findings
In contrast, if we look at the estimates in Panel B, we find that the most popular destinations of Mexican non-citizens leaving Arizona after 2007 were New Mexico, Colorado, California and Utah. While two of the destinations are the same regardless of the control group being used (namely: New Mexico and California), the remaining ones differ.
capturing differences in the behavior of Mexican non-citizens leaving Arizona, as opposed to those leaving other states in the control group, should be of second order.
One might wonder if other demographic groups not targeted by the intensified immigration enforcement measures were reacting similarly. If so, it would be harder to attribute the observed interstate mobility patterns among Mexican non-citizens to the toughening of immigration enforcement. To assess if that was the case, Table 3 displays the results from estimating the model for non-Hispanic natives using, as well, the two different control groups.
To the extent that they are citizens, they should not be impacted by intensified enforcement measures. In addition, since they are not Hispanic, we likely avoid the possibility that they might be tangentially impacted by the policy, as it is often the case with naturalized Hispanics or
Hispanic natives in mixed-status households. 11 Perhaps the most noticeable finding is the fact that non-Hispanic citizens became more likely to move from Arizona to either New Mexico (when using Arizona's synthetic control) or California (when using the broader control group) after 2007 -states to which Mexican non-citizens appear to have also migrated to.
VI. Summary and Conclusions
We examine the destinations of likely unauthorized immigrants leaving Arizona in the aftermath of the adoption of intensified immigration enforcement. Learning where these displaced population flows chose to reside is important, not only from the perspective of assessing the effectiveness and planning the implementation of immigration enforcement, but also in understanding the spillover effects of a piecemeal immigration enforcement approach on other states. In addition, regardless of the control group being used, the destination states for nonHispanic citizens, for whom the response to the intensification of immigration enforcement should be, if existent, of second order, seem to overlap with those of Mexican non-citizens.
Hence, in addition to potential complementarities between immigrants and natives, 
